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1 Introduction
The following notion of forcing was introduced by Grigorieff [2]: Let I ⊂ ω be
an ideal, then P is the set of all functions p : ω → 2 such that dom(p) ∈ I. The
usual Cohen forcing corresponds to the case when I is the ideal of finite subsets
of ω. In [2] Grigorieff proves that if I is the dual of a p-point ultrafilter, then ω1
is preserved in the generic extension. Later, when Shelah introduced the notion
of proper forcing, many people observed that Grigorieff forcing was proper. One
way of proving this is to show that player II has a winning strategy in the game
Gω for P (see [3], page 91.)
The notion of Axiom A forcing was introduced by Baumgartner [1]. If P
satisfies Axiom A, then player II has a winning strategy in the game Gω and
thus is proper. Indeed, most of the naturally occurring proper notions of forcing
are Axiom A (e.g. Mathias or Laver forcing). Thus it is natural to ask whether
or not Grigorieff forcing satisfies Axiom A. The main result of this paper is a
negative answer to this question. We will prove this by introducing another game
GU and showing that if P were Axiom A then player II would have a winning
strategy in this game. We will then prove that the game GU is undetermined.
2 Definitions and Preliminaries
Throughout this paper U will denote a p-point ultrafilter and I will denote the
dual ideal. We let [X ]
<ω
= {s ⊆ X | |s| < ω}. And we will denote ordinal
names by α˙. We let Seq(X) denote the set of finite sequences of elements of X.
If s = 〈x0, . . . , xn〉 ∈ Seq(X) and y ∈ X, then s∗〈y〉 = 〈x0, . . . , xn, y〉 ∈ Seq(X).
0This paper forms part of the author’s dissertation, written under the direction of Simon
Thomas
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DEFINITION. The game GU is for two players playing alternatively.
Player I plays a partition of ω, {In | n ∈ ω}, such that for all n, In ∈ I and
player II plays finite subsets Fn ⊂ In. Player II wins iff
⋃
n∈ω
Fn ∈ U . (1)
Note that this definition makes sense for an arbitrary non-principal ultrafilter
U . However, if U is not a p-point, then player I clearly has a winning strategy.
DEFINITION. A partial order P is said to satisfy Axiom A if there is a collection
of partial orders {≤n| n ∈ ω} of P satisfying:
i) p ≤0 q implies p ≤ q
ii) p ≤n+1 q implies p ≤n q
iii) if 〈pn | n ∈ ω〉 is a sequence such that
p0 ≥0 p1 ≥1 p2 ≥2 . . . ≥n−1 pn ≥n . . . (called a fusion sequence),
then there is a q ∈ P such that for all n, q ≤n p
iv) for all p ∈ P, for all n ∈ ω, and for all ordinal names α˙, there exists q ≤n p
and a countable set B such that q  α˙ ∈ B.
DEFINITION. Grigorieff Forcing
P(U) = {p : ω → 2 | dom(p) ∈ I} where q ≤ p iff q ⊇ p.
The main results in this paper are the following two theorems.
Theorem 1 Gregorieff forcing does not satisfy Axiom A.
Theorem 2 The game GU is not determined.
3 Grigorieff Forcing and GU
In this section we will prove the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 If P(U) satisfies Axiom A, then player II has a winning strategy in
the game GU .
PROOF. Suppose P(U) satisfies Axiom A.
Claim 1 Let p ∈ P(U), n ∈ ω, and I ∈I , then there exists q ∈P(U) such that
q ≤n p and | I \ dom(q) |< ω. (2)
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PROOF OF CLAIM 1: Let p, n, and I be given. We may assume I is infinite.
Let {Yα | α < 2ω} be an enumeration of ℘(I) and set α˙ = {〈α, pα〉 | α < 2ω}
where pα : I → 2 is the characteristic function of Yα. Since P(U) satisfies
Axiom A, by (iv) there’s q ∈ P(U) and a countable set B, such that q ≤n p and
q  α˙ ∈ B. But then | I r dom(q) |< ω as required. 
Now we describe a winning strategy for player II in the game GU . Sup-
pose player I plays I0 at the o
th move, then player II sets p0 = χI0 and
plays F0 = ∅. After the n − 1st turn, player I has played I0, . . . , In−1 and
player II has played F0, . . . , Fn−1 and chosen p0≥0p1≥1 . . .≥n−2pn−1. At the
nth move player I plays In. Then by the claim there exists pn ∈ P(U) such
that pn≤n−1pn−1 and | In \ dom(pn) |< ω. Thus player II can play Fn =
In \ dom(pn). At the end of the game 〈pn | n ∈ ω〉 forms a fusion sequence,
and it follows from Axiom A (iii), that ∪dom(pn) ∈ I. And thus player II wins.

Notice that lemma 1 and theorem 2 imply theorem 1.
4 The Game GU is undetermined
We shall prove the theorem as two lemmas.
Lemma 2 Player I does not have a winning strategy in the game GU .
PROOF. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that player I has a winning strategy.
Let σ : Seq([ω]
<ω
)→ I be player I’s winning strategy. Then ran(σ) is countable.
Let 〈Zn | n ∈ ω〉 be an enumeration of ran(σ) such that σ(∅) = Z0, let J0 = Z0
and for n ≥ 1 let Jn = Zn \ ∪j<nJj . Since ∪ran(σ) = ω, the set 〈Jn | n ∈ ω〉
forms a partition of ω. Thus there exists Y ∈ U such that | Y ∩ Jn |< ω and
hence | Zn∩Y |< ω for all n ∈ ω. Now consider the following game where player
I plays by σ and player II plays
Fn = Y ∩ σ(∅, F0, . . . , Fn−1) (3)
Notice that for all n, there exists some m such that
Fn = Y ∩ Zm. (4)
Clearly ∪Fn = Y ∈ U , so player II wins.  To prove lemma 3 we shall need the
following definitions and results from Grigorieff [2].
DEFINITION.
i) A ⊂ Seq([ω]<ω) is a p-tree if it is non-empty and closed under taking
initial segments.
ii) If s ∈ A, the ramification of A at s, denoted RA(s), is the set of all
a ∈ [ω]<ω such that s ∗ 〈a〉 ∈ A.
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iii) A is an I-p-tree if for any s ∈ A, there exists X ∈ U such that [X ]<ω ⊆
RA(s).
iv) H is an I-p-branch of A if it is a branch such that ∪{H(n) | n ∈ ω} ∈ U .
Theorem 3 (Grigorieff [2]) Every I-p-tree has an I-p-branch.
Lemma 3 Player II does not have a winning strategy in the game GU .
PROOF. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that player II has a winning strategy
µ. Player I will construct a “tree of games” such that along each branch player II
plays by µ, but there will be a branch such that player I wins the corresponding
game. First we need the following technical result.
Claim 2 For all n ∈ ω and for any sequence I0, I1, . . . , In of pairwise disjoint
elements of I , there exists Y ∈ U , Y ⊆ (ω \ ∪{In | i ≤ n}) satisfying:
(∀t ∈ [Y ]<ω)(∃I ∈ I)[(t ⊂ I ⊂ (ω \
⋃
i≤n
Ii)) ∧ (µ(I0, . . . In, I) ∩ t = ∅)]. (5)
PROOF OF CLAIM. Let n, I0, . . . , In be given. Suppose the claim is false.
Then we can define, by induction on m ∈ ω, a sequence of pairs 〈Xm, sm〉 such
that
i) X0 = ω r
⋃
i≤n Ii
ii) for all m ≥ 1, Xm = Xm−1 \ sm−1
iii) (∀I ∈ I)(sm ⊂ I ⊂ X0)→ µ(I0, . . . , In, I) ∩ sm 6= ∅
If we set J0 =
⋃
i∈ω s2i and J1 =
⋃
i∈ω s2i+1 then one of these must be in I , say
J0 ∈ I. But then for all i ≤ ω, µ(I0, . . . , In, J0)∩s2i 6= ∅, so | µ(I0, . . . , In, J0) |=
ω, contradicting the assuption that µ is a winning strategy for player II.
Player I constructs a tree A ⊂ Seq({〈I, F, s〉 | I ∈ I, F, s ∈ [I]<ω}) by
induction on the height n of a node such that, if 〈〈I0, F0, s0〉, . . . , 〈In, Fn, sn〉〉 ∈
A then
i) Ii ∩ Ij = ∅ if i 6= j
ii) (1 ≤ i ≤ n)(Fi = µ(I1, . . . , Ii))
iii) (0 ≤ i ≤ n)(si ∩ Fi = ∅)
iv) I0 = F0 = s0 = ∅.
v) The projection map pi : 〈〈I0, F0, s0〉, . . . , 〈In, Fn, sn〉〉 → 〈s0, . . . , sn〉 is an
injection.
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Suppose we’ve decided which B = 〈〈I0, F0, s0〉, . . . , 〈In, Fn, sn〉〉 ∈ A. Fix
such a B. By the claim, there exists Y ∈ U satisfying property 5. For each
t ∈ [Y ]<ω, choose It satisfying property 5. Let RA(B) = {〈I, F, s〉 | s ∈
[Y ]<ω, I = Is, F = µ(I0, . . . , In, Is)}.
Let τ ⊂ Seq([ω]<ω) be the tree obtained from A via the projection map pi
Then, by the construction, τ is an I-p-tree, and hence has an I-p-branch H.
Let 〈〈In, Fn, H(n)〉 | n < ω〉 be the corresponding branch in A. Then, since
∪{H(n) | n ∈ ω} ∈ U , this is a play of GU which player I wins. But player II
has used the strategy µ in this play, which contradicts the assuption that µ is a
winnig strategy for player II.
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